Gould, Trends as Changes in Variance: A New Slant on Progress and Directionality in Evolution

328
 JOURNAL OF PALEONTOLOGY, V. 62, NO. 3,1988

perhaps in the simplified and stereotyped realm of bean-bag models: molecules in a box, or grains of sand on a beach. But our world is one of massive constraint mediated by the tree-topology of evolution. Once groups are lost for whatever reason, they cannot reappear, and the range of disparity shrinks. More importantly, if evolutionary time has directionality (see Gould et al., 1987, for a defense of this position), then life can't get back to its former state following a massive reduction in diversity or disparity. If genomes coalesce through time, and if the Burgess phyla had unusual potential for change as a heritage of common ancestry then not far distant (despite the profound differences in form among phyla), then loss of the oddballs imposed a permanently reduced disparity upon the entire clade of Metazoa--for survivors were not free to radiate this way again. Reduction of variance imparts direction intrinsically. Let us thank our lucky stars for the survival of Pikaia.

CONCLUSION: HOW DOES THE THEME OF
TRENDS AS CHANGES IN VARIANCE FIT WITH
CURRENT REVISIONIST VIEWS OF
EVOLUTIONARY THEORY?

This paper does not deny the existence of trends properly called anagenetic, or products of change within unbranched lineages. Conventional anagenetic change may occur within populations (Sheldon, 1987; Bown and Rose, 1987), but most reported cases are dubious (Gould and Eldredge, in press), and I do not believe that this mode accounts for much in the total pattern of evolution. Valid cases tend to add a rib, a bump, or a millimeter over millions of years--and such changes simply do not extrapolate to the evolutionary patterns that historians of life are charged to explain (they are also too slow to ascribe to conventional directional selection--see Gould and Eldredge, 1977).

An unconventional form of directional change may properly be termed anagenetic at the level of species within clades. Trends may occur within a clade, accompanied by no change in variance, disparity, or number of species. Suppose, for example, that new species tend to arise in a preferred morphological direction because allometry and ontogeny channel possibilities for novelty. In such cases, the number of species in the clade might remain constant (as extinctions balance originations), and modes, means, medians, and extreme values at both tails might move, in lockstep fashion, towards new cladal values. We could not attribute such a trend to changes in variance, nor could anagenesis within species contribute if punctuated equilibrium prevailed. Such a trend could be called anagenesis at the clade level, with species assuming the role played by organisms in traditional anagenesis within populations.

This paper concentrates, instead, upon those "trends" (often falsely so conceived) that arise as consequences of changes in variance among species within clades. I try to provide a "bestiary" of examples (to convince colleagues that this category is large and important), not a logical compilation of all possible types within this broad domain. In particular, I recognize that at least two rather different causes underlie the relevant changes in variance: increase or decrease in number of items, and change in disparity among a constant number of items. (Many or most real cases may mix both, of course.) Thus, for the two main examples worked out in detail with original data, foraminifers (p. 323) display an increase trend based on number of species, while batting averages (p. 326) form a decrease trend rooted in falling disparity among a constant number of players.

I choose to unite these disparate kinds of trends not only because they have a common (but usually unrecognized) root in changes of variance, but also because a proper grasp of this theme might be important for our general understanding of macroevojution. On the negative side (for debunking is vital), recognition of trends as changes in variance, not anagenesis of entities, removes the rationale for most justifications of evolutionary "progress." Progress, after all, has been the culturally-embedded prod to our main interest in trends all along; we still seek to imbue time and evolution with some meliorist property, some subtle justification for our own intrinsic importance as evolutionary latecomers. Why else did we link the notion of trend to the concept of adaptation in the first place, and why else did we consider the unproven idea of orthoselection a conceptual victory?

Interpreted anagenetically as the causal movement of an entity, trends seem inevitably linked with progress. Increase trends advance, and decrease trends hone. The entity is the essence of the system itself, and must be moving for a reason. But if "entities" are misleading abstractions, and the real phenomenon is a change in variance among items, then different interpretations, not linked to progress, must often prevail. Increase trends may arise automatically from an asymmetry in point of initiation relative to potential range, and perceived movement in the open direction may not record progress, but only the marginal position of the starting point. Decrease trends may arise by random plucking in a directional world with no reaccess to lost domains; the winnowing of the Burgess fauna may record a random subset of survivors, not a honing of anatomical excellence.

But I regard a positive theme as more important, for I believe that the phenomenon of trends as changes in variance has important bearing on both central themes in current, revisionary work on the basis of evolutionary theory: 1) concepts of structure and constraint as an antidote or leavening for overemphasis on adaptation (structural vs. functional thinking); and 2) hierarchical, selection theory to broaden Darwin's reductionist premise that all causality resides in the struggle among organisms. In trends produced by changing variance, the primary questions will usually be structural, rather than immediately adaptational. This shift in emphasis--indeed (in most cases) this reversal of perspective--may be the most important reform in thinking that a reinterpretation of trends as changes in variance could inspire. No longer do we focus on the question: why (for what adaptive reason) is this entity moving this way? We ask instead: why did the originator start here, or why is the range of potential realization restricted in this way? Apparent movement may be an uninteresting consequence.

Questions about starting points and potential ranges are usually structural; they embody themes of constraint (physiological impossibility for invasion of land by most marine creatures), or higher-level effects (what aspects of ecologies and population structures grant small creatures a greater potential for initiating clades?). For Cope's rule, we must ask "why did it start here," not "why did it move there?" For batting averages, we must grasp the change between average and extreme ability, and appreciate the structural limit upon best performances, not lament a nonexistent loss of former greatness.

On the theme of hierarchy, we must recognize that many trends formerly interpreted as anagenetic movement of an entity are actually generated by the higher-level process of species sorting (Vrba and Gould, 1986)--that is, by differential success of species leading to expansions or contractions of variance. For most phenomena of macroevolution, nature works as an entity making and breaking machine at the level of species, not as a converter of variation within populations into large-scale trends among clades. For trends, the key to understanding is often not the perceived excursion itself (for the "entity" supposedly in motion may be a misleading abstraction, or a forced and sec-

150